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PLURAL VISION: INTERNATIONAL LAW SEEN
THROUGH THE VARIED LENSES OF DOMESTIC
IMPLEMENTATION
D. A. Jeremy Telman∗
The essays collected in this volume have evolved from
papers presented at a conference on “International Law in the
Domestic Context” held at the Valparaiso University School of
Law in April 2009. To some extent, the conference was a response
to the questions raised by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Medellín v. Texas1 and our collective curiosity about how other
states deal with tensions between international obligations and
overlapping regimes of national law.
In Medellín, the U.S. Supreme Court found that Texas was
entitled to ignore a ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
in the Avena case.2 The Court thus permitted Texas to proceed
with the execution of a Mexican national who had not been given
timely notice of his right of consular notification and consultation
in violation of the United States’ obligations under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations.3 This ruling seemed to be in

∗
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Professor Penelope Andrews for her assistance in helping to organize the
conference at which the papers collected here were originally presented; to the
Law School for its institutional support and to its staff for their invaluable
logistical and organizational support; and to the Law Review editors both for
their willingness to see the papers through to publication and for their efforts in
achieving that goal.

1

128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008).

2

Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar.

31).
3

Apr. 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. no. 6820. See id., Art.
36(1)(b) (providing that, at the request of a foreign national criminal defendant,
“the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the
consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of
that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is
detained in any other manner”). The ICJ found that the U.S. had violated its
Article 36 obligations with respect to Avena and other Mexican nationals,
including Medellín. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 71-72, ¶ 153 (finding, by a vote

1
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tension with two iconic documents setting out the relationship of
international law and domestic law in the United States. First, the
Medellín decision is hard to square with the U.S. Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause, which provides that treaties shall be “supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”4 In addition, Medellín seems at odds
with the famous dictum from The Paquete Habana: “International
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination.”5
Although it is tempting to conclude that Medellín was
wrongly decided, the reality is that our constitutional tradition
speaks with many voices on the subject of the relationship between
domestic and international law. In order to gain a broader
perspective on that relationship, we invited experts on foreign law
to introduce us to the way other states attempt to reconcile
international commitments and the domestic constitutional order.
Hans Kelsen’s monism offers a nifty solution to the
problem of the status of international law as domestic law. Kelsen
believed that there must be only one law if there is to be law at all
and thus that domestic law and international law must be part of
one normative system. As Kelsen explained in 1934, his “pure
theory” of law recognized “that a continuous sequence of legal
structures, gradually merging into one another, leads from the
universal legal community of international law, encompassing all
states, to the legal communities incorporated into the state.”6

of fourteen to one, that the United States had violated its obligations under
Article 36(1) of the VCCR).
4

U.S. Const. art. VI, ¶ 2.

5

20 S.Ct. 290, 299 (1900).

6

HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 124
(Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson, trans. 1992).
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Kelsen’s approach to the relation of international law and
domestic law makes sense. If domestic law were not subordinated
to international law but could trump it, states would routinely
demand to be excused from their international obligations based on
superior domestic law. Moreover, from Kelsen’s perspective, as a
factual matter, international law is higher law than domestic law,
because it is only by virtue of the recognition of state governments,
as a matter of international law, that domestic law preserves its
monopoly on the domestic use of force.7 The internationally
recognized legitimacy of state government is what gives that
government’s regulations the force of law rather than of naked
power.
There is, however, a practical impediment to Kelsen’s
monism. Even in a monist world, there must be a legal process
whereby international law is operationalized as a part of domestic
law. Even if we accept that international law is supreme law and
should take precedence over any contrary domestic law, there must
still be a mechanism assuring that supremacy. As Kelsen
acknowledges, state law does not cease to be valid law just because
it contradicts international law until some adjudicatory body strikes
down or refuses to enforce the state law to the extent of its
inconsistency with the state’s international obligations.8 And so,
even from a monist perspective, we need a mechanism for securing
the orderly implementation of international law in the domestic
order.
But the monist perspective is not the only perspective. In
Commonwealth countries, for example, the dualist approach
prevails.9 International law is not a part of the domestic law unless
7

See id. at 120 (contending that a state only has lawmaking authority
because international law empowers states to make law).
8

See id. at 118 (noting that even an unconstitutional statute remains a valid
statute until overturned by a legal act).
9

See Dianne Otto, Protecting Human Rights and Countering Terrorism:
Australia’s Contraditory Approaches to Implementing Its International Legal
Obligations, 44 VAL. L. REV. ___, ___ [manuscript at 1] (2010) (noting that that
Australia has adopted a dualist approach); Gib van Ert, Dubious Dualism: The
Reception of International Law in Canada, 44 VAL. L. REV. ___ (2010) (noting
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implemented through national legislation. It is clear from the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution that the Framers
intended to break with the Commonwealth approach. Having
experienced the inconveniences and embarrassments associated
with having the governments of the Colonies ignore the
international obligations of the national government under the
Articles of Confederation, the Framers made treaties Supreme Law
of the Land, and specified that treaty law would trump state law
and that state courts must give effect to U.S. treaty commitments.10
Customary international law has likewise been regarded as “a part
of our law” since at least the Paquete Habana, but in the post-Erie
world, but as Gwynne Skinner explores in her contribution to this
volume,11 it is very difficult to identify exactly what part of our
law it is.12
While our constitutional design looks remarkably monist,
that design is counterbalanced by the judicially-created doctrine of
self-execution, according to which treaties are only automatically a
that because English law does not repose law-making authority in the King,
treaties can only become domestic law through a legislative act).
10

See D.A. Jeremy Telman, Medellín & Originalism, 68 MD. L. REV. 377,
414-16 (2009) (reviewing statements of the Framers regarding the purpose of
the Supremacy Clause).
11

See Gwynne Skinner, Customary International Law, Federal Common
Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction, 44 VAL. L. REV. ___ (2010).
12

See Curtis Bradley, et al., Sosa, Customary International Law and the
Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 874 (2007) (arguing that
after Erie, courts can implement rules of customary international law “only in
accordance with the requirements and limitations of post-Erie federal common
law”); Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV.
815, 821 (1997) (criticizing what they characterize as the “recent ascendancy” of
customary international law as federal common law). The U.S. Supreme Court
refused to adopt this “critique of the ‘modern position.’” See Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (ruling that Erie does not prevent federal courts
from recognizing substantive rules arising out of customary international law).
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, endorsing Bradley and
Goldsmith’s position. See id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (maintaining that
federal courts have no power to recognize causes of action arising under
customary international law).
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part of domestic law when they do not contemplate the need for
legislative enactment.13 The Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín
clearly rejects any presumption that treaties are self-executing. On
one reading of Medellín, treaties that have domestic ramifications
require congressional implementing legislation, unless they make
clear on their face the parties’ intentions that they be non-selfexecuting.14
This doctrine of non-self-executing treaties may well be
inconsistent with the plain, textual meaning of the Supremacy
Clause, and with the express views of the Framers regarding the
purpose of the Supremacy Clause. However, the monist view may
be inconsistent with other aspects of the constitutional design. As
others have pointed out, our Constitution reposes the legislative
power in Congress.15 Permitting legislation by treaty would
bypass the House of Representatives, which seems inconsistent

13

See United States v. Perchemen, 7 Pet. 51, 88-89 (1833) (finding a treaty
self-executing where it does not stipulate to the need for some future legislative
act).
14

See Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1357 (requiring stipulations in the treaty itself
that its provisions require no legislative enactment); see also See David J.
Bederman, Medellín's New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation, 102 AM. J. INT'L
L. 529, 529 (2008) (noting that scholarly attention regarding the Medellín
opinion had focused on “the Court's supposed ruling as to the presumptive nonself-execution of international agreements entered into by the United States”);
Julian G. Ku, Medellín's Clear Statement Rule: A Solution for International
Delegations, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 609, 615 (2008) (acknowledging that
Medellín might well be criticized for “departing from existing understandings of
the non-self-execution doctrine and imposing a new clear statement
requirement”); Vázquez, Less Than Zero?, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 563, 570 (2008)
(noting several statements in the majority opinion suggesting that treaties are
presumptively non-self-executing). But see Curtis A. Bradley, Intent,
Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 540, 541
(2008) (suggesting that Medellín is best understood as requiring a treaty-bytreaty approach to the question of self-execution without resort to a general
presumption).
15

See U.S. const., Art I, § 1 (vesting all legislative powers in “a Congress of
the United States”).
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with the constitutional design.16 Moreover, since bills that raise
revenue must originate in the House of Representatives,17 it is hard
to see how a self-executing treaty that required expenditures could
in fact be implemented without the support of both Houses of
Congress. Similarly, if the United States were to sign on to an
international agreement that created new international crimes,
given the post-Erie absence of general federal common law, such
crimes could not become part of our domestic law without some
sort of legislative enactment.
Despite the monist overtones of the Supremacy Clause, as a
product of our constitutional history, the United States has a strong
dualist tradition as well. This tradition has recently been embodied
in a school of thought that I will call “sovereigntist,” because its
proponents regard state sovereignty as the fountainhead from
which all law must derive.18 Soveigntism, of very different types,
16

See JOHN YOO, POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 215-249 (2005) (arguing that the constitutional
design calls for the President to take the lead in formulating foreign policy but
vests domestic lawmaking power in Congress).
17
18

See U.S. const., Art I, § 7, ¶ 1.

See Judith Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism:
Missouri and Holland, 73 MO. L. REV. 1105, 1113-14 (2008) (defining
sovereigntism as “a position insistent on a nation's right to define and delineate
its own lawmaking”) Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs)
Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 654 & n. 16 (2002) (characterizing
sovereigntism as “grounded in a general skepticism of international law and
international lawmaking processes”). Leading sovereigntists include academics
such as Jeremy Rabkin, Curtis Bradley and Julian Ku, government officials such
as John Bolton and people who have served as both scholars and government
officials, such as John Yoo and Jack Goldsmith. Examples of scholarship
espousing a sovereigntist position include JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND
PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005); JACK L.
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005);
JEREMY RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? (2005); JEREMY RABKIN, THE CASE
FOR SOVEREIGNTY (2004); JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS
(1998); Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural
Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2003); Julian G.
Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New
Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000); John R. Bolton,
Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 205 (2000).

Plural Vision

7

is represented in this volume, in the contributions of Robert
Blomquist19 and Richard Stith.20 For Professor Blomquist,
international law poses a threat to the exercise of executive
authority to conduct U.S. foreign affairs, an authority that he
believes resides uniquely in the President.21 Professor Stith is an
unusual type of sovereigntist, in that he is not particularly
interested in the protection of U.S. sovereignty. His sympathies lie
more with weaker states whose unique and diverse legal, social
and cultural norms are in danger of being subsumed within the
homogeneity of the new world religion, international human rights
law.22
Initially it seems, supporters of national sovereignty and
independence should have no strong objection to the supremacy of
international law, since international law is based on consent, at
least in theory.23 In reality, there are elements of international law
As Julian Ku points out, at least some sovereigntists object to the label. See
Julian Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties
and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L. J. 319, 342 & n. 121 (2005) (contending that
people characterized as “sovereigntists” are more interested in a critique of the
“internationalist” conception of international law than in developing a prosovereignty ideology).
19

Robert Blomquist, The Jurisprudence of American National Security
Presiprudence, 44 VAL. L. REV. ___ (2010).
20

Richard Stith, If Dorothy Hadn’t Had Toto to Pull Back the Wizard’s
Curtain: The Fabrication of Human Rights as a World Religion, 44 VAL. L.
REV. ___ (2010).
21

See Blomquist, The Jurisprudence of American National Security
Presiprudence, 44 VAL. L. REV. at ___ [manuscript at 12] (arguing that courts
should grant the President “wide latitude” in reconciling national security and
liberty).
22

See Stith, Human Rights as a World Religion, 44 VAL. L. REV. at ___
[manuscript at 3] (characterizing international human rights law as a new world
religion in which forces of international domination are met on the domestic side
– at least in weaker states only by forces of surrender); id at [manuscript at 4]
(sympathetically citing a newspaper ad denouncing the World Trade
Organization for working to “undermine the constitutional rights of sovereign
nations”).
23

See Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 115, 141 (2005) (“It is commonly observed that international law
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that do not conform to the theory, including jus cogens norms,24
customary norms when applied to new states that did not exist at
the time of the norms’ formation,25 and new international criminal
tribunals that could exercise jurisdiction over the nationals of states
that have not consented to such jurisdiction.26 As Professor Stith’s
paper highlights, international norms and institutions sometimes
purport to be law whether or not they are endowed with the indicia
of legitimacy identified by Thomas Franck – right process and
substantive fairness.27 Moreover, they might exercise an
imbalanced compliance pull28 on states powerless to resist the
powerful states that stand behind international legal norms (and
international economic assistance programs) while permitting
themselves to ignore such norms when they prove inconvenient.29

cannot bind states without their consent, and notions of consent are often said to
be the basis for [customary international law].”).
24

See Laurence R. Hilfer, Nonconsensual International Lawmaking, 2008
U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 89 (2008) (noting that when international adjudicatory bodies
recognize the peremptory status of legal norms, they do not require evidence of
state consent before finding states bound).
25

Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. at
72-74 (offering a rational choice model to permit new states to object to
customary international law rules at the time of the states’ formation).
26

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 12 (1998), 37 ILM

999.
27

See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
7-8 (1996) (arguing that the legitimacy of legal rules turns on the processes
through which they are adopted and on the rules’ substantive fairness from the
perspective of distributive justice).
28

“Compliance pull” is Thomas Franck’s name for the “inherent pull
power” toward compliance that legal norms exercise and which Franck views as
an “index of legitimacy.” Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International
System, 72 AM. J. INT’L L. 705, 712 (1998).
29

See Stith, Human Rights as a World Religion, 44 VAL. L. REV. at ___
[manuscript at 1-2] (contrasting U.S. dualism and superpower status which
preserve a democratic choice that is unavailable in countries such as Argentina
and Mexico where international law is directly effective and supreme).
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Given the tensions in our constitutional design, it is not
surprising that the domestic implementation of international
obligations gives rise to certain difficulties. However, as the
papers collected in this volume indicate, in its struggles with this
particular issue, the United States is, for once, anything but
exceptional. Nonetheless, there are aspects of the law of the
United States that are at least idiosyncratic. This volume sheds
new light on those idiosyncrasies while also exploring the
difficulties of reconciling international obligations and the
domestic legal order.
The essays collected here were presented in three separate
panels during the conference. The organization of the volume
follows the same organizational principle. The first three papers
thus focus on questions relating to the implementation of
international human rights as domestic law. The two papers that
follow address issues relating to international obligations and
national security law. The final section, which comprises four
papers, provides a comparative perspective on how other
international law is introduced into the domestic legal systems of
Australia, Canada, China and the United Kingdom.
*
*

*

Our first three papers address the difficulties that the
United States and other countries face in the implementation of
human rights law as domestic law. One hurdle to U.S.
participation in international legal regimes is our federalism,
because as Medellín illustrates, the federal government cannot
always compel the states to abide by international obligations
taken on by the federal government.30 Paul Finkelman’s paper
30

See Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1356 (finding that because none of the treaties
at issue in Medellín create binding federal law in the absence of implementing
legislation and that no such legislation exists, and finding that a decision by the
International Court of Justice does not create binding federal law that could
overcome the state bar to successive habeas petitions, Texas may proceed with
the execution of Medellín notwithstanding the fact that such an execution would
place the United States in violation of its international obligations).
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reminds us that in the ante-bellum period, “American states treated
each other as ‘foreign entities’” and “often refused to recognize
and give comity to the laws of other states.”31 Moreover, Professor
Finkelman cites to both the Alien Tort Statute32 and to the frequent
citation to foreign law in early U.S. cases as evidence that
international and foreign law have always been a part of our law.33
But Professor Finkelman’s more surprising argument is that
in the ante-bellum period, U.S. the several states regarded the laws
of other U.S. states no differently from the way they regarded the
law of foreign states. In that context, the U.S. Supreme Court
often resorted to international law concepts to settle conflicts
among states or between citizens of separate states.34 Professor
Finkelman’s contribution also illustrates how race was often at the
center of the development of U.S. doctrines relating to inter-state
comity and choice of law.
The United States’ unique Alien Tort Statute is another
ingredient of U.S. law that renders idiosyncratic the U.S approach
to problem of international law as a part of the domestic order.
The Alien Tort Statute has been at the center of litigation that has
attempted – through the disorderly and ad hoc process that is the
stuff of common law adjudication – to specify the status of
customary international law within our domestic legal order.35 As
31

Paul Finkelman, When International Law Was a Domestic Problem, 44
VAL. L. REV. ___ (2010).
32

28 U.S.C. § 1350.

33

Finkelman, When International Law Was a Domestic Problem, 44 VAL.
L. REV at ___ [manuscript at 2].
34
35

Id. at ___ [manuscript at 6].

See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (addressing
Alien Tort Statute claim brought by a Mexican national alleging unlawful
detention in Mexico by a Mexican national); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
726 F.2d 774 (D.C.Cir.1984) (rejecting Alien Tort Statute claim by survivors of
a terror attack perpetrated by foreign nationals in Israel); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing Alien Tort Statute claim brought by a
Paraguayan national whose brother had been tortured and killed by Paraguayan
police).
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Professor Skinner points out, scholars are divided into two camps –
the modernist and revisionist positions – on the issue.36
Professor Skinner intervenes forcefully in this debate with
an essay that consults 18th and 19th century sources of law.
Pinpointing the status of customary international law turns out to
be a difficult task because, although the Supreme Court has stated
that U.S. law “recognized” what then was called the “Law of
Nations” at the time of the Founding,37 it was not recognized as
part of general federal common law at the time because that body
of law did not emerge until later in the 19th century.38 While
Professor Skinner notes that there are strong arguments on either
side of the academic debate regarding whether or not customary
international law was part of the law of the United States for the
purposes of Article III of the Constitution, she concludes that the
contemporary disagreement reflects similar disagreements that
raged throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. In fact, she argues,
that the debate over the status of customary international law was a
product of larger debates regarding the relationship of the federal
government and the states within our federal system.39
Professor Skinner nonetheless argues that customary
international law – or at least some aspects of it are included in the
“laws of the United States” for the purposes of creating federal
jurisdiction under Article III of the U.S. Constitution and that 28
U.S.C. § 1331 also grants federal courts jurisdiction over federal
common law doctrines that incorporate or recognize customary

36

See Gwynne Skinner, Customary International Law, Federal Common
Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction, 44 VAL. L. REV. at ___ [manuscript at 610] (identifying modernists as those who believe that federal law incorporates
customary international law either in whole or in part and revisionists as those
who as those who believe that, post-Erie, federal incorporation of custom
requires a legislative act).
37

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.

38

Skinner, Customary International Law, 44 VAL. L. REV. at ___
[manuscript at 10].
39

Id. at ___ [manuscript at 12-14].

Valparaiso Law Review

12

2010

international law.40 She thus navigates a middle ground between
the modern and revisionist positions on the status of customary
international law as “part of our law,” arguing that only customary
rules “recognized” under general federal common law can give rise
to claims in federal courts.41
While these first two contributions focus on the domestic
mechanisms, such as constitutional principles, comity or the Alient
Tort Statute, for recognizing international human rights law or
humanitarian principles as part of our law, Professor Stith’s paper
introduces a stirring antidote to what might be described as
international human rights law triumphalism. Compared with
developing nations forced to surrender to the new prophets of the
new world religion, as Professor Stith describes them, the United
States is rather well-defended when it comes to resisting the
universalizing impulses of international law. Hence, the original
panel’s concern with how best to implement international human
rights law in the domestic context suggests an “American
paochialism.”42 Professor Stith suggests that such resistance may
be a necessary means of preserving a fruitful and blessed diversity,
not only in the U.S., but globally.
Professor Stith problematizes the international human
rights movement on a number of levels, but his most sweeping
argument is that rights are, by their very nature, anti-democratic.43
But Professor Stith’s real concern is with positive rights; that is,
rights that the state has a positive duty to protect, as opposed to
negative rights, which require only that the state leave us alone.44
The problems that Professor Stith identifies are best represented in
General Comment 15 on the right to water, which the Committee

40

Id. at ___ [manuscript at 18-19].

41

Id. at ___ [manuscript at 26-27].

42

Stith, Human Rights as a World Religion, 44 VAL. L. REV. at ___
[manuscript at 1].
43

Id. at ___ [manuscript at 4].

44

Id. at ___ [manuscript at 8].
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on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights promulgated in 2002.45
Professor Stith characterizes the Committee as a nonrepresentative body of non-lawyers that has promulgated a
document that seeks through legal language to bind states to
protect a positive “right” to water that is not expressly mentioned
in any international agreement. The Committee’s Comment is
effective, says Professor Stith, not because it is backed up by the
threat of force but because it is backed up with “guilt and shame
for those who refuse to comply.”46 For Professor Stith, the
oracular quality of the pronouncements of international bodies
creates dynamics more akin to religious than to legal discourse.47
Professor Stith raises significant and familiar objections
relating to international law’s notorious “democracy deficit.” In
considering how to address those objections, it is important to note,
especially in the context of a volume on the domestic
implementation of international law that those who decry the
democracy deficit in international law greatly exaggerate the extent
to which international law is distinct from domestic law in this
respect.
At least within the United States, people regard
international law with suspicion for the same reason they are wary
of (or think they are wary of) “activist judges.” They think of
courts and of international law as elite (or at least non-populist),
unaccountable because unelected (although state courts now are
largely elected by people who have no idea who they are voting
for) and alien. International law is alien for obvious reasons;
courts are alien because they use a technical jargon and decide
45

EC.12/2002/11, 20 Jan. 2003, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/a5458d1d1bbd713fc1256cc400389e94/$FIL
E/G0340229.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2009).
46

Stith, Human Rights as a World Religion, 44 VAL. L. REV. at ___
[manuscript at 9].
47

Dianne Otto points out that, at least in Australia, international attempts at
shaming the government into adopting human rights protections through
domestic measures have fallen on deaf ears. Otto, Protecting Human Rights
and Countering Terrorism, 44 VAL. L. REV. at ___ [manuscript at 4].
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cases on grounds other than the merits that are completely opaque
to the non-lawyer.
In fact, however, our supposedly democratically
accountable branches of government are not much more so than
are courts. As far as our House of Representatives is concerned
(the so-called “People’s House”), because of gerrymandering, it is
far more accurate to say that our politicians choose their
constituents than the other way ’round.48 And once they have
chosen their districts, members of the House have to devote much
of their two-year terms to securing re-election rather than to
legislating.49 Things are better in the Senate, but only by degree,
not by an order of magnitude, and their six-year terms render
Senators only slightly more accountable than judges.50 Presidents
may of course be turned out of office, but they are never turned out
48

See Reelection Rates of Incumbents in the U. S. House By Congress and
by State, available at http://www.thirty-thousand.org/documents/QHA-08.pdf
(last visited March 20, 2009) (finding that rates of return in the House of
Representatives easily exceed 90% for members who seek re-election; Richard
L. Hall, Equalizing Expenditures in Congressional Campaigns: A Proposal, 6
ELECTION L. J. 145, 148 (2007) (noting that even in 2006, a year of dramatic
party reversal, 94% of Senators and House Members who sought reelection
won). On the use of political gerrymandering to protect incumbents or to
deprive incumbents of their safe seats, see generally Jeffrey Toobin, The Great
Election Grab: When does gerrymandering become a threat to democracy? THE
NEW YORKER (Dec. 8, 2003).
49

See Peter Francia & Paul Herrnson, The Impact of Public Finance Laws
on Fundraising in State Legislative Elections, 31 AM. POLITICS RESEARCH 520,
531 (2003) (finding that Members of Congress spend on average 34% of their
time in office raising funds for reelection). STEVEN S. SMITH, et al., THE
AMERICAN CONGRESS 7 (4th ed. 2005) (estimating that the average
Representative raises $10,000 per week over a two-year term and that the
average Senator raises $22,000 per week over a six-year term); Thomas M.
Susman, Lobbying in the 21st Century – Reciprocity and the Need for Reform, 58
ADMIN. L. REV. 737, 744 (2006) (observing that most Members of Congress
therefore spend most of their time raising money).
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Compare Judith Resnik, So Long, LEGAL AFFAIRS 20, 21 (July/August
2005) (finding that the average tenure in office for federal judges who have
retired in the last two decades has been about 24 years) with ROGER H.
DAVIDSON, et al., CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS (2008) (finding that the average
tenure in office for Senators is approaching 16 years).
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of office for one bad decision in particular, while judges are often
vilified for upholding laws that passed unnoticed when enacted by
a legislature.51 In any case, the real power is not in passing
legislation but in drafting it, and for the most part the people who
do so are either unelected and unaccountable specialists within the
executive branch, unelected and unaccountable legislative aids or
unelected and unaccountable lobbyists.
There is no doubt that international law faces challenges
not only of democracy deficit but also of transparency. But here
again, international institutions are not qualitatively different from
national institutions. Because of the well-documented tendency of
the executive branch to expand the scope of classified documents,
there has been a huge increase in the portion of our executive
branch which is completely inaccessible to the voting public.52 A
much larger portion of it is technically accessible but in reality just
as hidden because keeping tabs on specialized executive agencies
is more than a full-time job. Legislatures are no better of course,
as they routinely pass important legislation without reading it.53
This is inevitably true because of the sheer length of omnibus
legislation and because of the byzantine amendment process that
inevitably causes bills to morph and grow on their way to adoption.

51

For example, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)

52

According to the National Archives’ Information Security Oversight
Office, which is empowered pursuant to 32 C.F.R. § 2001 to collect yearly
statistics on classification and declassification of materials from any agency
“that creates or handles classified information,” the number of classified
documents increased from 8.65 million in 2001 to 23.1 million in 2007. See
Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing
Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 133-34 (2006) (noting that
government officials frequently admit that far more material is declared
“classified” than is really necessary for national security purposes).
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See Ittai Bar-Siman Tov, Legislative Supremacy in the United States?:
Rethinking the ‘Enrolled Bill’ Doctrine, 97 GEORGETOWN L. J. 323, 338-39
(2009) (reporting that ominbus legislation is “often passed by Congress via allnight sessions under tight deadlines, without any notice or time for members to
read or understand them”).
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Compared with our domestic political institutions
international bodies may have a tremendous discursive advantage.
Their deliberations may be private, at least in part, but there is
always significant opportunity for public comment and criticism,
and the reasoning underlying statements of international
adjudicatory or treaty bodies, warts and all, is presented in public
documents that are subject to criticism and resistance.
Thus, expanding on Professor Stith’s critique of rights and
of international human rights, we might pose the same sorts of
questions with respect to the domestic legal order. Domestic
courts might very well view the Alien Tort Statute, that “legal
Lohengrin”54 with the same sort of suspicion which we ordinarily
reserve for foreign and international law. While we are at it, we
can look at other domestic institutions that touch on human rights
and that are neither constitutional nor democratic in nature, such
as: Presidential signing statements which can gut legislation
seeking to force the executive to abide by international human
rights instruments; the Totten doctrine and the state secrets
privilege, which can shield the executive from liability even for
constitutional violations provable through publicly-available
evidence; sole executive and legislative-executive agreements,
which account for over 90% of the United States’ international
agreements and skirt the Senate’s constitutional treaty powers; and
the reservations, understandings and declarations that the Senate
attaches to the rare treaty submitted for its “advice and consent.”
*
*

*

Our second set of papers addresses foreign affairs and
national security concerns, and there we begin with a return to the
subject of federalism, as explored in Michael Granne’s paper.55
54

See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J)
(calling the Alien Tort Statute a legal Lohengrin because nobody knows
“whence it came”).
55

Michael Aaron Granne, Two-Dimensional Federalism and Foreign
Affairs Preemption, 44 VAL. L. REV. __ (2010).
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One of the interesting oddities of the Medellín case, to which I
alluded earlier, is that it could be read as requiring the
acquiescence of the federal government, represented strenuously
by the executive branch, in a foreign policy decision made by a
state court in Texas.56 Professor Granne notes that Medellín is just
one in a long line of cases in which the courts have wrestled with
the question of foreign affairs preemption. In Professor Granne’s
view, the courts have not articulated a principled approach to
preemption in this area and the resulting caselaw does not appear
to be internally consistent.
Professor Granne argues that courts’ approaches have
seeemd incoherent because courts fail to adequately appreciate that
conflicts between state and federal interests in foreign affairs can
be understood as inhabiting three different paradigms, each of
which requires a different approach to the weighing of the state
and federal interests implicated. The first paradigm, for which
Zschernig v. Miller57 is emblematic, is often called “dormant
foreign affairs preemption,” in which federal law automatically
displaces any state law that interferes with foreign affairs powers
entrusted to the federal government alone.58 Second, we have what
Professor Granne calls “obstacle preemption.” This arises when
state action presents an obstacle to the accomplishment of
congressional goals. The emblematic cases illustrating this
paradigm are Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,59 in
which the Supreme Court struck down at Massachusetts law that
was at odds with congressional sanctions against the state of
Burma (Myanmar), and American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi,60 in which the Supreme Court struck down
56

Telman, Medellín & Originalism, 68 MD. L. REV. at 385 (noting that the
Medellín Majority permitted a state court in Texas to determine U.S. foreign
policy over the strong objections of the executive branch).
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389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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Granne, Two-Dimensional Federalism, 44 VAL. L. REV. at ___
[manuscript at 3-4].
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530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act.61 Finally,
there may be cases where a Congressional statement of intent of
preempt state law could be required.62
Professor Granne applies recent scholarship differentiating
between vertical and horizontal federalism in order to provide a
more coherent basis for foreign affairs preemption. Vertical
federalism describes situations when federal uniformity concerns
justify permitting federal law to trump state law. Horizontal
federalism describes situations in which there is a need to
coordinate state activities, as in the area of environmental
protection. While foreign affairs might seem like a classic case for
vertical federalism, Professor Granne argues that elements of
horizontal federalism also ought to inform foreign affairs
preemption doctrine.63
Some state actions implicate foreign affairs but do not
create any significant tensions with federal control of foreign
affairs. Examples of such state actions include cultural and
educational exchanges and trade agreements between individual
states and foreign nations. With respect to this category, Professor
Granne’s model would require federal preemption only when
specifically called for by federal statute or treaty.64 The second
category is state policies, such as “buy American” statutes, which
give rise to non-trivial interference with federal uniformity
concerns in the area of free trade. Here, Professor Granne argues,
the obstacle preemption approach is appropriate.65 Finally, there
are state statutes that single out some foreign government for
sanction. These statutes implicate both the uniformity concerns
associated with vertical federalism and the coordination problems
associated with horizontal federalism. To such cases, Professor
61

Granne, Two-Dimensional Federalism, 44 VAL. L. REV. at ___
[manuscript at 4-5].
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Id. at ___ [manuscript at 5].
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Id. at ___ [manuscript at 7].
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Id. at ___ [manuscript at 11-12].
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Id. at ___ [manuscript at 12].
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Granne argues, the dormant foreign affairs preemption approach is
best suited.66 Professor Granne’s paper thus offers an elegant
solution that makes sense of a confusing tangle of related cases.
The thread that unites our two papers that address national
security issues is the question of the role of courts in adjudicating
disputes relating to foreign affairs. While Professor Granne
develops a nuanced preemption doctrine that recognizes the
competing interests of the several states and the branches of the
federal government, Professor Blomquist focuses on the
institutional competence of the executive branch and thus argues
for judicial deference to the foreign affairs powers of the President,
whom he characterizes as “the national security sentinel with vast,
but not unlimited powers to protect the nation from hostile,
potentially catastrophic, threats.”67 Because of the President’s
vastly superior store of knowledge and expertise, Professor
Blomquist argues that court’s should not question executive
national security decisions “unless clearly necessary to
counterbalance an indubitable violation of the text of the
Constitution.”68 Professor Blomquist also stakes out a position
against the use of foreign law as legal precedent, especially when a
U.S. Court is reviewing the executive’s determinations relating to
national security, a field for which Professor Blomquist has created
a handy term, presiprudence.69
Professor Blomquist’s position, opposing the use of foreign
law is uncontroversial, and in fact Professor Blomquist cites to no
case in which a U.S. court has ever relied on foreign law as
precedent.70 The consequences of his position on presiprudence
66

Id. at ___ [manuscript at 12].

67

Robert F. Blomquist, The Jurisprudence of American National Security
Presiprudence, 44 VAL. L. REV. ___, [manuscript at 7] (2010)
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Id. at ___ [manuscript at 7].
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Robert F. Blomquist, American National Security Presiprudence, 26
QUNNIPIAC L. REV. 439 (2008)
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See Blomquist, The Jurisprudence of American National Security
Presiprudence, 44 VAL. L. REV. at ___ [manuscript at 17, n.55] (citing only a
hypothetical reliance by federal judges on foreign law as precedent).
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with respect to international law are, by contrast, potentially
explosive. For example, Professor Blomquist follows Eric Posner
and Adrian Vermeule, who argues that the United States should
only abide by its international obligations under the laws of war
when the U.S. benefits from such compliance, taking into account
the possible reputational costs of non-compliance.71 This position
clearly informed the Department of Justice during the Bush
administration, but it was rejected by that administration’s
Department of State.72 This conflict between two agencies within
the same executive branch complicates the logic of presiprudence
and also, as I have argued elsewhere,73 renders dubious the
executive branch’s claims to superior expertise in matters of
foreign affairs. If the President chooses the opinions of his highly
politicized and in part non-expert Office of Legal Counsel over
those of his highly professionalized legal advisors within the
Department of State on matters of international law, the executive
branch must abandon its argument that courts should defer to the
executive branch’s superior expertise.
*
*

*

Our final set of papers introduces us to the dynamic
regarding the implementation of international law as domestic law
in Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada and China. In those
71

Id. at ___ [manuscript at 14].
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Compare John C. Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, Memorandum for William
J. Haynes II, 11-42 (Jan. 9, 2002) (arguing that the President is not bound either
by treaty law or by customary international law with respect to the conduct of
the War on Terror in Afghanistan), available at
http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20020109.pdf (last visited Oct.
3, 2009) with William H. Taft IV, Memorandum to John C. Yoo, 1 (Jan 11,
2002) (arguing that “[i]ntneral law does not support key conclusions” in the
Yoo/Delahunty memorandum).
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See D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Foreign Affairs Power: Does the
Constitution Matter? 80 TEMPLE L. REV. 245, 277-78 (2007) (pointing out that
the same argument, made by John Yoo, is hard to square with Yoo’s career in
the Justice Department, in which he frequently and successfully persuaded the
White House to ignore expert advice coming from the Department of State).
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countries, as here, the picture is more complicated than the simple
choice of monism or dualism might suggest. But these cases
contain insights into foreign practices that provide useful
perspectives on our own. For example the first contribution in this
final set of four, from Jim Kennan,74 includes a discussion of
judicial views of deference to the executive branch in national
security cases, that provides a startling contrast to the position set
out in Professor Blomquist’s essay.
Mr. Kennan’s discussion of the case law from the United
Kingdom culminates with some excerpts on the subject of
deference to executive authority from the Belmarsh case, which
was decided in the House of Lords in 2004.75 In rejecting
sweeping claims to executive expertise in national security matters,
the Law Lords referenced the skepticism “which has attached to
intelligence assessment since the fiasco over Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction,” and suggested that such faulty assessments were
to blame for the participation of the military forces of the United
Kingdon in Iraq.76 They also declared that terrorism, while
“hideous” and “serious,” does not pose an existential threat.
Rather, the threat arises from our own responses to terror.77 Indian
courts echo this view that courts must protect human rights even in
times of national crisis.78 The Kantian dictum, fiat justicia ruat
caelum, seems to have retained much of its original force.
Turning to his native Australia, Jim Kennan notes that
Australia has no constitutional protections of individual rights akin
to our Bill of Rights, nor does it automatically incorporate
international human rights obligations into domestic law. Rather,
Australia seems to have a canon of interpretation much like our
own, that statutes should be construed to be consistent with
74

Jim Kennan, The Role of International Human Rights Law in Australian
Law, 44 VAL. L. REV. ___ (2010).
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Id. at ___ [manuscript at 9-12].

76
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international obligations absent a clear statement to the contrary.79
But unlike the United Kingdom, Australia is reluctant to address
human rights concerns on any basis other than the common law.80
Mr. Kennan’s conclusion is clear: the English approach is
preferable.81 But his essay holds out hope that there may be hope
for human rights in Australia. It is to be found not in the common
law, nor in the customary law of nations but in the common sense
of Australian jurors willing “to stand back from the war on terror
rhetoric which has so dominated public discussion since 2001.”82
Dianne Otto’s piece picks up where Jim Kennan’s left off,
acknowledging Australia’s insistence on protecting human rights
only through domestic enactments. But she then picks up on some
of the themes of Richard Stith’s paper, although in a completely
different register, expressing concern that Security Council
resolutions aimed at countering international terrorism might give
rise to a new hegemonic international law.83 Professor Otto tells
what for U.S. lawyers is a fairly familiar narrative in which
national pride in one’s own domestic protections of civil rights,
coupled with distrust of judicial processes forms the basis for
opposition to the implementation of international treaty
obligations.84 In fact, Professor Otto suggests that the response of
the conservative Howard government to criticisms of its human
rights record was “reminiscent of US exceptionalist claims.”85
79

Id. at ___ [manuscript at 1-2]; see also Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
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Id. at ___ [manuscript at 13].
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However, Professor Otto notes the contrast between
Australia’s reluctance to implement international human rights
protections and it “eagerness to implement its international legal
obligations” relating to post-9/11 Security Council resolutions,
especially Resolution 1373.86 This resolution was remarkable for
the swiftness with which it was adopted and for its sweeping
nature. Unlike previous Security Council resolutions, Resolution
1373 does not call for temporary measures addressing a specific
threat to international peace and security. Unfortunately, despite
its legislative quality, Resolution 1373 bears the “opaqueness and
exclusivity” that are the hallmark of executive enactments and of
the Security Council’s protocols more generally.87 Pursuant to
Resolution 1373, Australia enacted legislation creating enhanced
police and surveillance powers modeled on the USA Patriot Act of
2001.88 This is international law-making at its most muscular, and
it is undertaken by a body that Professor Otto describes as
“patently unrepresentative, un-consultative, and lacking in
transparency and accountability.”89
Despite her disappointment with Australia’s record on
human rights and its willingness to toe the line when it comes to
Security Council directives on national security issues, Professor
Otto concludes by stressing the need for all states to recognize the
universality of human rights.90 The problem is not that
international law is brought into the domestic process but that this
occurs through hegemonic law rather than through what she calls
the “participatory international law-making processes” involving
both states and civil society.91
Gib van Ert’s contribution to our volume begins with a
simple syllogism: Under Canadian law, only the executive can
86

Id. at ___ [manuscript at 7].
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make treaties and the executive cannot make law; therefore,
treaties are not law.92 In principle, Canadian law does not suffer
from the ambiguities that led to the Medellín case: all treaties
require legislative implementation in order to be part of the
Canadian domestic legal order.93 But Canada is not a pure dualist
system; it too is a hybrid in which customary international law is
directly incorporated into common law and in which judicial
interpretation can give direct effect to treaties as well.94 In
addition, in developing and interpreting domestic human rights
norms, Canadian attorneys and courts are free to refer to – and
even to rely on – legal norms that arise in foreign and international
contexts.95 Moreover, Canadian courts would appear to be even
less deferential to executive interpretations of international and
treaty law than are their counterparts in the United Kingdom.96
Mr. van Ert’s discussion of Canada’s incorporation
doctrine, whereby rules of customary international law are directly
incorporated into domestic law, is especially instructive. Based on
the academic uproar about the “modernist” and “revisionist”
positions discussed above,97 one would think that opportunities to
give direct effect to international custom arise all the time. As Mr.
van Ert notes, they almost never arise, because: (1) customary rules
generally govern state behavior and thus rarely have relevance to
domestic legal issues; and (2) it is very difficult to prove that a rule
of custom exists.98 Were it not for the Alien Tort Statute, U.S.
courts likely would have little reason to ponder the status of
customary international law as part of our law.
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Equally instructive is Mr. van Ert’s discussion of the
Canadian approach to treaties. Because Canadian courts presume
that legislation was intended to conform to Canada’s international
obligations, absent evidence of “unequivocal legislative intention
to default,” statutes are interpreted with the aid of treaty law.99 As
a result, despite its seemingly pure dualism, Canada arrives at a
position not unlike that of the United States’ “last in time,”
doctrine, in which subsequent legislation trumps treaty obligations
only if the two cannot be reconciled. A statute is thus interpreted
so as to place the United States in violation of its treaty obligations
only if Congress, in enacting the statute, expressed its clear and
unequivocal desire to do so.100
In the final essay in our collection, Zou Keyuan provides a
sweeping history of the status of international law in China, the
only non-common-law country addressed in our volume.101 Of the
countries surveyed, China seems to be closest to the monist model,
since Chinese law provides that China’s international obligations
supersede any contrary domestic law.102 However, Chinese
scholars view the Chinese approach as a modified form of dualism,
which acknowledges the separate existence of the two types of law
and does not establish a hierarchical relationship between them.103
Regardless how one characterizes the Chinese approach on a
theoretical level, Chinese practice, as described by Professor Zou,
is exemplary. When China takes on a new international obligation,
it implements that obligation through legislation and it alters
99

Van Ert, Dubious Dualism, 44 VAL. L. REV. at ___ [manuscript at 5-6].
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existing laws and regulations to bring domestic law into
conformity with the new international standard.104 And, as do
courts in the U.S. and Canada, Chinese courts interpret statutes
wherever possible so as to reconcile domestic and international
law.105
However, when it comes to the implementation of human
rights norms, China’s practice is less exemplary. Professor Zou’s
extended discussion of the Chinese practice of “re-education
through labor” (RTL) illustrates one area in which China’s
domestic policies are not in conformity with international
standards. China’s RTL policies do not place it in violation of any
treaties that it has ratified, but they are inconsistent, says Professor
Zou, with China’s having signed (but not yet ratified) the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and with other
non-binding human rights declaration to which China is a party.106
The role of courts in implementing international law in the
domestic context in China is equally unclear. Professor Zou
reports that they have had occasion to do only rarely and their
practice has been inconsistent. While some courts have applied
international law in certain commercial and maritime contexts,
there is some authority for the position that international human
rights treaties may not be given direct effect under Chinese law.107
*
*

*

I began this introductory essay with a discussion of the
monist and dualist approaches to the question of the incorporation
of international law as domestic law. In this area, as in so many
areas, the Holmesian dictum applies: the life of the law has been
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not logic but experience.108 Programmatic statements in founding
documents or in law review articles will not determine the status of
international law in the domestic context. It is to be worked out
through the various legal histories of each state. As each state
grapples to reconcile its national legal traditions with its
international obligations, it is worthwhile to pause and consider the
experiences of others. It is our hope that this volume contributes to
that process.
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See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”).

